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by B.J. DIVE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The latest German law on the codetermination of Supervisory Boards came 
into effect in July 1976. In one sense it was a major advance in the develop-
ment of codetermination which some argue began 128 years previously when 
in 1 848 the Constitutional National Assembly first established factory commit-
tees with certain rights of worker participation. It was also a compromise result 
of intensive political discussion and activity particularly in the period after Willy 
Brandt declared in 1973 that codetermination would be one of the 'main tasks' 
of his government. 
Germany industry has had a two-tier Board system since the 1880s. Under 
the provisions of the 1976 Act companies with more than 2,000 employees 
(481 enterprises in 1 980) must have a Supervisory Board (' Aufsichtsrat') with ol 
equal representation for labour and capital, and an Executive Board w 
('Vorstard'). Under previous legislation (1952, 1972) the labour represents- st 
tion on the Supervisory Boards of joint stock companies (AG) had been limited ri1 
to one third. The duties of the Supervisory Board include the appointment of ol 
the members of the Executive Board, one of whom must be a Labour Director 1 
(' Arbeitsdirektor'). a1 
HISTORY 
Codetermination emerged in post war West Germany as the result of a com-
promise between the British and American members of the Allied Military 
Government. The aim was to prevent the reformation of the vast iron, steel and 
coal cartels which had enabled the Nazis to make war. The British (labour) 
Government favoured nationalisation while the Americans insisted upon free 
enterprise. The necessary compromise gave rise to the 'Monster' of codeter-
mination. It should not be overlooked that this new system worked initially not 
because of its inherent excellence but rather because of the special and unique 
circumstances in which it was set up. A spirit of co-operation and limited con-
flict was essential given the urgent need to rebuild the German economy and 
society. It could be argued that any industrial relations system would have 
flourished in that situation. 
The precise meanmg of codetermination is Joint Regulation. 'Codetermina-
tion' is simply a transliteration of German 'Mitbestimmung'. But the 
German conveys more than 'to determine with'. It also connotes an ele-
ment of co-operation and coresponsibility and it is this aspect of responsibility 
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which is overlooked in the E:ng11sh. Joint regulation, would be a better transla-
tion. 
The DGB (German Trade Union Federation) applies codetermination to four 
separate levels -
codetermination on the job. 
- codetermination throughout the firm. 
- codetermination in entrepreneurial policy. 
- codetermination throughout the economy. 
Under the first Codetermination Act of 1 9 51 equal numbers of employee and 
shareholder representatives were appointed to the Supervisory Boards of all 
AG companies producing coal, iron and steel with a permanent labour force of 
1000 or more. These Boards normally consisted of 11 members - five 
nominated by the employees and five nominated by the shareholders, the 
eleventh member being the so-called neutral or independent, acceptable to 
both sides. Two of the five employee representatives had to be employees, two 
full time trade union officials and the fifth, an independent, nominated by the 
trade unions. The Labour Director could not be elected against a majority of 
employee representative votes. This has led in practice to Labour Directors in 
this industry being trade unionists and some have argued that this practice has 
led to a consequent lowering of the standards of personnel management com-
pared to the rest of German industry. 
The German unions have always insisted that the iron, coal and steel model 
of codetermination (with its parity of representation) should be extended to the 
whole of German industry. The 1 9 51 Act was equally popular with the 
shareholders. In 1945 they had been totally dispossessed of their ownership 
rights. Codetermination gave them back at least half of something they had 
otherwise lost. (This is in stark contrast to German shareholders' attitudes in 
1974, when a Social Democrat/Liberal codetermination bill was seen to take 
away some existing rights and further erode their control over their own proper-
ty.) 
THE PRACTICE OF CODETERMINATION 
Codetermination has two meanings in German law: codetermination at the 
·shop floor level and codetermination on the Supervisory Board. 
Under the Works Constitution Laws ( 1952 and 1972 Works Councils have 
considerable rights of participation particularly in personnel matters. The 
Works Councillors are employees who are elected by all employees - with the 
exception of 'Leitende Angestellte' (executive employees) - of a plant. The 
Councillors do not have to be trade union members, although they usually are. 
The Trade Union (limited to one per industry) has no nghts of codetermination 
itself in a plant or company. This Works Constitution Law has not changed 
since 1972. 
Under the Codetermination Act 1976 the employee representatives on the 
Supervisory Board must be employees of the company but not necessarily 
members of the Works Council. They are elected by all employees .of the com-
panv. 
The two types of codetermination therefore have a different legal basis with 
different rights. Theoretically they should be kept qpart in the company. In 
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practice the employee representative functions at both levels are discharged by 
the same person(s). Thus, as far as personnel policy is concerned, codeter-
mination at both levels should be regarded as a single entity. 
For example, in the Lever Sunlicht Company the Chairman of the Mannheim 
factory Works Council is at the same time: 
- Chairman of the company Works Council 
- Employee Representative on the Vice Chairman of the Company Super-
visory Board 
Member of the Land Executive Committee of the Chemical, Paper and 
Ceramic Workers' Union, and finally 
- Vice Chairman of the Concern Works Council of the German Unilever 
group. 
CODETERMINATION OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD 
In German law, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon legal systems, management (the 
'Executive Board') and policy making (the 'Supervisory Board') are separated. 
The Executive Board alone is responsible for the day to day running of the 
business. 
As far as the duties of the Supervisory Board are concerned, it is important to 
distinguish between that of a joint stock company (AG) and that of a limited 
liability company (GmbH) . The duties of a Supervisory Board in an AG include: 
- appointment of the members of the Executive Board 
- supervision of the Executive Board. 
The legislator has not explicitly stated what is to be understood by supervis-
ing the Executive Board . Practice differs generally in individual companies. 
In the case of GmbH companies, only the shareholders have the right to ap-
point the Directors of the Executive Board. Hence the status and influence of 
GmbH Supervisory Board is different to that of an AG. 
The Supervisory Board of the AG has the right to receive to report by the Ex-
ecutive Board on important business matters and events. The Supervisory 
Board cannot give binding instructions to the Executive Board, even if the · 
management of the company by the Executive Board is unsatisfactory. 
However the Supervisory Board can legally enforce its will by dismissing Ex-
ecutive Board members who might claim unfair dismissal. 
Since 1976 three different types of employee codetermination of Super-
visory Boards have existed. These are as follows: 
a) Parity codetermination for companies producing iron, coal and steel and a 
neutral chairman. 
b) The one third: two thirds Supervisory Baord of the Works Constitution Laws. 
This applies to companies with 500-2000 employees. 
c) The codetermined Supervisory Board in large companies with more than 
2000 employees. The law stipulates parity representation and provides for 
varying sizes of Supervisory Boards taking into account companies of dif-
ferent size. 
I will deal in detail here with only the type (c) Supervisory board. These super-
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visory Boards generally meet four times a year at wh1ch they are informed by 
the Executive Board of important business matters which might typically in-
clude: 
- entry into new lines of busmess and/or discontinuation of existing ones. 
- closures. 
major investments. 
- economic progress of the business. 
- policies and plans. 
- personnel changes in top positions 
The employee and trade union representatives on the Supervisory Board are 
elected by the employees of the company in a very complicated and time con-
suming election procedure. The representatives of capital are appointed by the 
shareholders. 
The Supervisory Board elects from its midst a Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
on a two-thirds majority. If such a majority is not forthcoming then a second 
round is held in which the shareholder members elect the Chairman and the 
employee members elect the Vice Chairman, a simple majority of votes being 
necessary in each case. 
Resolutions can be adopted only if at least half the members take part in the 
voting. If there is a stalemate of actual votes cast, the Chairman has the option 
of a casting vote. The labour and shareholder benches each tend to present 
one voice at these meetings since both sides usually conduct preliminary 
discussions before the Supervisory Board meetings. 
Usually the employees' Supervisory Board members are experienced, well-
informed works Councillors and trade unionists. The DGB does not view the 
labour representatives as 'over managers'. It is not their task to outdo manage-
ment and individual shareholders in mercantile ingenuity or technical creativity. 
Conversely the decisive criterion for the appointment of the shareholders' 
representatives alongside business qualifications is practical experience in per-
sonnel management and some familiarity with the views and methods of Works 
Councillors and trade unions. 
One member of the Executive Board must be appointed 'labour Director'. 
This term ('Arbeitsdirektor') was copied from the 1951 Act on the Coal, Iron 
and Steel Industry. But in the 1976 Act the term 1s misleading, since the 
previous requirment of labour representatives' approval does not apply. The 
'labour Director' is in fact the Personnel Director, and not the trade unionist 
worker director sought by the unions. Indeed his status in no way differs from 
that of the other members of the Executive Board. In practice a labour Director 
will hardly ever be appointed if the employee representatives are strongly op-
posed. 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE 1976 
CODETERMINA TION ACT 
The Act's validity was challenged by nine companies and 29 employers' 
associations. Essentially the plaintiffs hoped that the Court would set limits to 
codetermination by employees. This was understandable since the unions 
made no secret of seeking absolute parity on the Supervisory Boards. In their 
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view the 1976 Act was a beginning towards that goal. 
On 1 March 1979, the German Supreme Court pronounced its verdict and 
laid down guidelines on how to interpret the Act. The Court refused to be 
drawn into considering future implications. It determined that the law, in its 
present form, is compatible with the German Constitiution. The lawsuit made 
the following claims: 
a) The Act would lead to parity codetermination in reality and an unacceptable 
increase in power for the employee representatives . 
The Court decided to the contrary arguing that the law gives the share-
holders the greater control primarily via the mechanism of the Chairman's 
casting vote which in effect enables the shareholders to keep control over 
management selection and thereby control of the enterprise. 
b) The most important of the plaintiffs' arguments was that the Act violated 
the property rights of shareholders sanctioned by the Constitution 
('Grundgesetz') and that the legal and potential predominance of the em-
ployee representatives severely restricted the shareholders' inalienable 
rights of disposal and control. 
The Court ' s view, following from (a) above, was that there could be no such 
restrictions on the shareholders given they hold the upper hand via the legal 
provisions. 
In fact after this objection was raised at the parliamentary hearing of the 
bill in October 1975, the Bonn Coalition Parties (SDP & FDP) ham-
mered out changes to the draft in December 1 9 7 5 allotting the casting vote 
to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board who cannot be elected against the 
will of the sh&reholders. 
Mr HO Vetter, President of DGB, also argued 'that . . . parity codeter-
mination does not contravene the constitutional right to property . . . It 
leaves t o ownership half the controlling power over the enterprise and does 
not put its profitability to question' . 
c) The third important reason put forward in the case against the Act was that 
it impaired employer autonomy in collective bargaining, another axiom 
of the Constitution . 
It was maintained that the Labour Director could hardly be considered impar-
tial since he would normally be selected with the help of the employee rep-
resentat ives ' votes. 
The Court held , somewhat unconvincingly it might be said, that this 
argument was not completely invalid but it was not decisive in the Court's 
opinion . 
d) Finally it was argued that the specific function of the Labour Director and his 
election is not clear and that the law does not describe his responsibilities in 
any way . 
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The Court held that the law is sufficiently clear in this regard. 
The Labour Director must be in charge of the Personnel, Social and 
Welfare matters of the Company . His nomination follows the same pro-
cedure as any member of the Board and his rights and duties are the same as 
the other Board members in this general respect. The shareholders (via the 
casting vote) can appoint the Labour Director of their choice if 
necessary . 
REACTIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION 
THE UNIONS 
The German Trade Unions (DGB) initially resented having to define this 
case on the grounds that firstly, there was the possibility of the employers win-
ning their case and thereby virtually putting an end to any worthwhile form of 
extended codetermination . Secondly, they argued that the 1976 Act was an 
employers' Act since the trade union's model had been set out in the 1974 bill 
which was subsequently amended by the Social Democrats (SDP) after 
political pressure was exerted by their coalition partners, the Liberals (FDP) . 
. However when the decision of the Court was made known, the trade 
unionists were quite happy since the employers had lost their case! After op-
posing the existence of the Act the employers had been forced to accept it . A 
number of trade unions are now confident that the 1976 Act is but a further 
step along the path to inevitable total codetermination . 
The DGB is now intent upon marshalltng its resources to see its members 
are properly trained and organised to ensure the new Act operates effectively 
at the workplace. Much thought and effort is being aimed at achieving a closer 
working liaison between employee representatives on Supervisory Boards and 
members of corresponding Works Councils. It is working hard to make sure as 
many trade unionists as possible occupy the available positions on Supervisory 
Boards and Works Councils. 
This will be a major logistical task for the D.G.B. in the next few years and 
while it is preoccupied making the 1976 Act work there is little likelihood of it 
sponsoring any major legal developments during that period . 
THE EMPLOYERS 
Despite their challenge in the Courts, the Employer Associations (BDA) are 
also reasonably happy with the outcome of the case. The decision clarifies a 
number of points. 
It establishes quite clearly that the 1 9 7 6 Act does not provide for parity of 
codetermination for the employees, merely panty of representation. It une-
quivocally g1ves the shareholoers the upper hand. It underlines the 
predominance of the shareholders and their ability to keep control of manage-
ment selection. It clarifies the role and status of the Arbeitsdirektor, now clear-
ly recognised as the Personnel Director. The shareholders furthermore 
have the ultimate say in the appointment as the much disputed selection of 
Ford's national Personnel Director illustrates. 
Although the 1 976 Act does not conflict with the constitution because of 
the current legal dominance of the shareholders, it is felt by the employers that 
this implicity rules out anv possibility of the unions ever achieving full parity. 
Any extension would remove this power from the shareholders which would 
then be unconstitutional. Thus even though the Court did not explicitly say 
'this far and no further' the employers feel the effect of this judgement will 
nevertheless mean that in practice . They are confident that the thrust towards 
the more radical parity of decision making has been successfully parried. The 
resultant parity in numbers on the Supervisory Board will be workable since it 
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will not undermine or erode shareholder control as exercised by either the 
Supervisory or the Executive Board. 
Finally employers have noted that although the Court refrained from passing 
judgement on codetermination beyond what currently exits in the 1976 Act, it 
repeatedly mentioned in its 1 1 3 page submission that the legislature should 
make amendments to the law should it prove to have lasting adverse effects on 
the funtioning of companies. This could prove to be most significant in future, 
should the employers feel constrained to return to the Court on this issue. 
Thus, not surprisingly given Germany's post war history of social partnership, 
both parties are satisfied with the outcome of this case. More importantly 
they are now intent upon successfully implementing the new legislation. 
THE FUTURE 
There seems to be a common view in Germany that the tone of future in-
dustrial relations will depend very much upon the success or otherwise of the 
economy during the 1 980s. In saying this, Germans are very much aware of 
the problems which Sweden, for example, is currently experiencing on the 
socio-industrial front as a result of its economic difficulties. Other issues in-
clude projections of unemployment, the numbers of immigrant workers 
('gastarbeiters ' ). the likely impact of micro processors and the international 
financial role being thrust upon West Germany as the major bulwark of the key 
western economies. These are new problems for the Germans, especially the 
last factor . Left to themselves the Germans could predictably be expected to 
limit imports as a means of shoring up their own economy. Such a loss of im-
ports would prove disastrous for the Netherlands, Sweden and a number of 
other developed economies. Consequently NATO, the USA and Japan are con-
straining West Germany to adopt an international posture which will inevitably 
place cons iderable strain upon the domestic workings of the union-employer 
organisations which are likely to have different views and priorities to those of 
their federal government. Three important influences are worth exploring as af-
fecting future developments. 
TRI-PARTISM 
One of the great strengths of West Germany's industrial relations IS the lack 
of involvement of the Government. This is in stark contrast to NZ, .Australia, 
the UK and even Sweden where politicians have become enmeshed in the 
workings of industrial relations machinery. By limiting the Government to the 
legal and economic domains the Germans have succeeded more in depolarising 
the emotions underpinning their industrial disputes. 
For some years now the Government has appointed 'five wise men' 
(economic experts, usually University Professors) to produce an annual white 
paper on the state of the economy prior to the next collective bargaining round. 
Outlining its economic assumptions their paper typically outlines various· 
scenarios given different hypothetical wage settlements and corresponding 
growth rates. Politicians, industrialists and unionists then usually debate the 
wisdom, accuracy and conclusions of the 'five wise men'. In this way the 
Government cleverly sets up an a-political forum in which the key economic 
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issues of the day are aired and evaluated. This naturally has in indirect bearing 
upon the ensuing negotiations. 
A further stage in this 'tri-partite' process is the concerted action policy 
which is a consultative forum on economic and social issues set up by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1966. This forum which has an equal number 
of employer and union representatives tends to meet three or four times a year 
under the chairmanship of the Minister to enable the two sides to give the 
Government their opinions on the state of the economy and their advice on the 
necessary measures. A second instrument of this poicy is the Social Policy 
Discussion, a further consultative body consisting not only of representatives 
from both sides of industry but also from a number of institutions dealing with 
consumer and social affairs. 
Since the employers took their case to the Supreme Court the DGB has 
withdrawn from these various tri-partite forums. Now that the case has been 
settled there seems to be some optimism which indicates the discussions may 
be re-convened possibly without the various consumer-social institutions. 
MICRO-PROCESSORS 
Clearly one of the great issues already on the industrial horizon is the pro-
bable impact of micro-processors upon the economy in general and jobs in par-
ticular. 
The comparison to certain attitudes of the FOL, TUC, ACTU and that of the 
DGB is both enlightening and enlightened. The German trade unions see these 
developments as inevitable - their own research already indicates some 11 
million jobs could be affected by the micro-chip during the next 1 0 years or so. 
Rather than bury their heads in tlie sand they are demanding quite reasonably 
that industrialists and government provide more information, funds and 
research to help prepare for potential problems of re-training , redundancy and 
relocation of jobs. Although the prospects and present statistics look extremely 
daunting there seems to be a realisation that these problems can best be 
tackled by positive planning. 
There is also a definite recognition that t his can really only succeed if 
businesses remain competitive both at home and abroad . Once again the Ger-
man social partnership of unions and employers appears to be emphasising the 
ongoing creation of wealth as the necessary prelude to its subsequent 
redistribution rather than the other way round . This is one of the key dif-
ferences between the German socialists and those of many other western 
democracies. 
PROFIT SHARING 
I 
I~ is now felt there wil.l be littl.e further legislative advance of codetermination 
dunng the 1980s followmg the mtense debate of the 1970s. However, one issue 
which may come more to the fore during the next decade is that of profit shar-
ing. A number of trade unionists now favour the type of profit sharing pro-
pou~ded in 1975 by the Swedish trade union economist, Meidner. According 
to hts plan workers should be allocated a share of profits but not for their own im-
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mediate benefit as in France. Rather these shares should be pooled in central 
funds to be controlled by the unions. The unions could then embark upon a pro-
gramme of selective purchase of company shares such that by the turn of the 
century they would be the capitalists in control of industry. By then they would 
control both the shareholder and employee representatives on Supervisory 
Boards and as a result the question of parity would have become irrelevant. 
FORMS OF WORKER INVOLVEMENT 
There are four different forms of worker involvement recognisable in Western 
Europe . 
i) Communication - A two-way flow of information where manage-
iii Consultation 
iii) Collective 
bargaining 
iv) Codetermination 
ment continues to make the decisions. 
Involvement in decision making processes but 
management still the ultimate decision maker 
- A series of power plays where mutual agreement 
is aimed for, but where em-
ployee objectives can be forced upon manage-
ment if necessary . 
- A statutory requirement specifying employee 
agreement and responsibility for specific deci-
sions 
Germany has the most complete system and the greatest experience with 
these various types of worker involvement. The value of this experience should 
not be under-rated, since Supervisory Boards and Works Councils are not simp-
ly post-war phenomena in Germany It was one of the factors neglected in the 
Majority Report of the UK Bullock Committee in 1 9 7 7. One senior German ex-
ecutive likened that committee's recommendations for Worker Directors to try-
ing to learn to swim by diving into an empty pool! 
German Works Councils have the right to: 
- information on the company's financial results, mergers, rationalisations. 
consultation in certain aspects of personnel management such as recruit-
ment, training and reorganisation. 
German trade unions have a right to: 
collective bargaining, usually with an employer association . 
The Works Counc1ls have a right to: 
codetermination in all social matters such as work rules, hours of work, 
methods of payment, safety, health and dismissal. In addition the Sup-
ervisory Boards have codetermination rights concerning the appointment, 
payment and dismissal of Executive Directors as well as supervising their 
overall act1V1t1es . 
CONDITIONS FOR CODETERMINATION 
bl 
cl 
d) 
e) 
Observation of the GeriT)an system of codetermination leads one to the con- r 
elusion that the following conditions are essential for ensuring its success: t 
a) There is a general consensus in society about the economic order needed to f) F 
guarantee thA future well-bemg of the nation. Thus during the second half of i 
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1 970s when the British (Diamond Commission). the French (Sudreau Report) 
and the Dutch were entangled in debates about income differentials, Willy 
Brandt ridiculed talk about income redistribution (ahead of generation of 
wealth) as a subject best suited to the playgrounds of kindergartens. In short 
the Germans see little point in arguing about how to divide the cake until one 
is certain the cake exists . 
b) There is a general consensus about the role of the company in that economic 
order. As already indicated above, there is an emerging debate in Germany 
over how profit should be dispersed in society. But the starting point accept-
ed by both parties to the debate is the company's legitimate and necessary 
claim, to make profit . In fact some of Germany's best run private enter-
prises are offshoots of the DGB. 
c) There is a deep-seated willingness on both sides of German industry for an 
ongoing dialogue. Hence the central organisations are known as social part-
ners. No doubt this has stemmed in large measure from the common need 
following the war to rebuild the country. This in turn has generated a certain 
custom, even habit, of co-operation . It has also enabled the Germans to 
largely avoid the self-destructing class warfare syndrome which still pre-
occupies other national union movements. This is not to imply that German 
unionists and employers never have serious disagreements as their recent 
steel strike proves . The case before the Supreme Court which has just been 
discussed is another clear example of a serious dispute . But the main signifi-
cance of that case may really be the way in which both parties have accep-
ted the Court's decision and now appear to be concentrating upon making 
the new legislation work . 
d) Those employees with codetermination rights do not negotiate their own 
wages . The unions negotiate these rates but unions do not have a formal 
voice on either Supervisory Boards or Works Counci ls. Thus employees are 
not given the contradictory and nonsensical task of bargaining with them-
selves. Yet this is precisely the brand of industrial relations nihilism 
favoured by Bullock and most other advocates of Worker Directors operat-
ing through the single channel of the unions. The union penetration of only 
some 30% of the German workforce is no doubt another important factor in 
this context. 
e) The formula of one union to one plant greatly facilitates the system of code-
termination. Each German company ' s employees are automatically al igned 
to one of the 1 7 national industrial unions depending upon the nature of the 
company's business. Thus an employe~ of Unilever Germany working for, 
say, the Frozen Foods company of Langnese-lglo transferring to the deter-
gents company of Lever Sunlicht, would change unions. In this way 
companies and factories are spared the nonsense of demarcation disputes 
which can paralyse a New Zealand company with about 20 uAions common 
to one site. In Germany it is impossible for example for a handful of boiler-
men or whatever, to shut down a plant of 500 or 5,000 employees without 
the consent of their colleagues. 
f) Finally, since the German Federal Government has no direct role to play in 
industrial relations, issues and grievances are not clouded by political con-
siderations. Disputes remain a-political to be resolved by the central organisa-
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tions of employers and unions on regional or national bases as appropriate. If 
they are unsuccessful the dispute is then resolved by due process of law with 
the Federal Constitution as the final point of reference. The recent case over 
the 1 976 Codetermination Act is one example. Thus the Federal Government, 
it is argued, can avoid the pitfalls of politically dangerous actions such as the in-
comes policies which unseated respective British Governments in 1974 and 
1979. There is no need or scope for the German government to deregister 
recalcitrant unions. 
The political links of union federations such as the LO (Blue Collar) with the 
Social Democrats in Sweden is seen by many Germans as one reason for that 
country's difficulties, especially since the Social Democrats ceased to be the 
governmment in 1976. 
Most Germans seem to accept that the State's role in industrial relations is 
one of an enabling influence. It should create a climate enabling market forces 
to work successfully both at home and abroad. This of course has been not so 
difficult during Germany's last three expansionary decades. Should the 1 980s 
become a time of real recession in Germany it will be interesting to see whether 
the role of Federal Government in industrial relations remains non-
interventionist. 
It is also conceivable this situation could change if the Social Democrats ever 
obtained an absolute majority in the Federal House of Representatives 
('Bundestag'). They currently share power with the Liberals and it is possible, 
although unlikely, the Social Democrats might sweep the board this year. 
Should that occur Schmidt may not be able to placate the radical, and increas-
ingly more strident, left-wing of his party. After all it is clear that if the original 
codetermination bill put forward by the Social Democrats in 1975 had become 
law, it would have severely polarised German industrial relations. 
The possible future scenario of the Social Democrats controlling the 
Bundestag and the national economy in recession might trigger off un-
precedented industrial upheaval for post-war Germany. This would seem to be 
the severest test the system of codetermination could expect to face. 1 d) 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
The conditions underlying successful codetermination as outlined in the 
previous section do not exist in New Zealand. It is clear then that the German 
model of worker involvement would not work in New Zealand. Indeed given the 
smallness of the average New Zealand business such a formal approach to 
worker involvement hardly seems necessary. Yet notwithstanding the fact that e) 
probably only a dozen or so New Zealand firms would be large enough to be af-
fected by a German style Codetermination Act there are a number of aspects of 
the German approach to industrial relations worthy of emulation. 
a) Any steps to depoliticise New Zealand's industrial relations should be en-
couraged. The intrusion of politicians rarely adds significant competence. 
The use in Germany of the 'five wise men' to produce an annual discussion 
paper as an objective basis for debate over the various options available 
could be copied in some way. The numbers involved would be less important 
than the fact that those chosen should be acknowledged experts without 
any obvious political bias. Ideally there should be a system of rotation, as in 
Germany where these experts are usually Professors of Economics. 
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b) Such a discussion paper could help mould an agenda for tri-patrite discus-
sions. It is noteworthy that the value of such discussions was also recognis-
ed by the TUC and CBI in Britain in their separate publications in February 
1979. The New Zealand Employer's 'Balance in Bargaining' published last 
year largely echoed the same thoughts. Given this initiative the FOL's reac-
tionary opposition was somewhat surprising and disappointing . The modern 
thinking of unions in the developed countries suggests such attitudes are 
outmoded. The tripartite forum is the obvious place to cope with future pro-
blems and opportunities which the micro-chip will inevitably pose for New 
Zealand. The realistic concern and attempt to plan and organise for the 
future by the DGB is in stark contrast to the Luddite-like opposition of many 
New Zealand unionists . 
c) Another feature of German industrial success is the small number of indus-
trial unions. The useless proliferation of craft and general unions in New 
Zealand and the UK has been mentioned by other commentors almost ad 
nauseam. The TUC's constantly unsuccessful attempts at meaningful 
rationalisation highlights the problem of vested interests which also 
exist in New Zealand . Yet one country that has succeeded in this regard is 
Ireland. Today some 465,000 union members are represented by about 
90 trade unions . Still too many unions of course, but quite an advance 
when compared with New Zealand's 300 or so for a slightly smaller number 
of unionists . 
Furthermore since 1970, Ireland has developed a system for collective 
bargaining not dissimilar to the Germans, known as the 'national wage 
agreement' . It is the product of negotiations between ICTU (Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions) and employer bodies. When the terms are announced the 
individual unions hold national ballots to determine acceptability. Employers' 
bodies undertake a similar process of consultation. It has led to more 
orderly collective bargaining and is likely to be more acceptable than the 
current less democratic wage fixing system in New Zealand . 
d) Another feature of the Germans' model of involvement has been the fact 
that it started from the bottom. The German experience with Works Councils 
proved to be a vital forerunner to the establishment of Worker Directors. The 
experience of British Steel has further illustrated the folly of working from 
the top down. It is also significant that the latest Swedish legislation is entitl-
ed 'Industrial Democracy at the Workplace' (1977) and that this followed 
general disillusionment over their experiments with Worker Directors . 
e) The German experience clearly demonstrates the invalidity of the single 
channel argument, viz. that in all forms of representative democracy only 
trade unionsists should be involved. On the contrary the Germans have tend-
ed to insist that worker representatives must be first and foremost 
employees of the Company. Union membership is seen as somewhat in-
cidental. This is a corollary of (d) above that workers would be more con-
cerned about their workplace and immediate prospects whereas a union 
representative may be more inclined to subjugate the company's employee 
interests to those of the union. For a country like New Zealand where only 
about half the labour force is unionised the Germans' handling of this issue is 
most interesting. 
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CONCLUSION 
Germans do not claim their system is perfect or ideal. They openly 
,acknowledge the concepts of codetermination and industrial unions were 
thrust upon them by life's roulette. Obviously many features of modern West 
Germany result uniquely from the build - up to and disaster of World War II. 
Other institutions in that society are also singularly German; such as the educa-
tional and legal systems. It would be nonsensical to try to copy these culturally 
embedded aspects of the German industrial relations system. 
The main advantage in studying the German approach is to understand how 
and why it works. The aim must never be an attempt to design a transplanted 
copy of codetermination. Nevertheless the Bullock Majority Report of 1977 il-
lustrates just how foolhardy it is to completely ignore certain lessons of Ger-
many's success in the context of industrial democracy. 
This analysis has endeavoured to highlight the enabling conditions prevailing 
in the German industrial scene which could seemingly operate elsewhere. The 
focus upon the 1976 Codetermination Act and the subsequent events and 
reactions has hopefully helped to throw these factors into bolder relief. 
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THE 1980 
FEDERATION OF LABOUR 
CONFERENCE 
R.J. Harbridge* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Forty-Third Annual Conference of the New Zealand Federation of Labour 
(FoL) was held in the Wellington Town Hall from 6 to 9 May 1980. The creden-
tials committee of the conference reported that "there were 409 delegates at-
tending and three National officers, which included 45 women delegates, exer-
cising a total of 625 votes". 
This conference was significant as a meeting of trade unionists for three 
reasons. First, as the first conference of the 80s, the opportunity existed for a 
look back at the late seveties - the chance to review gains and losses - and 
the chance to look forward to the early eighties, and to assess the difficulties 
and challenges that would face New Zealand's trade union movement. Second, 
this conference was significant in terms of leadership. This was the first annual 
conference for the newly elected President, Jim Knox, and the Secretary, Ken 
Douglas, and the progress of this new leadership team was an issue for some 
delegates - not to mention some politicians and some journalists. Third, a 
number of long term policy decisions were proposed - the effects of which 
would have deep significance for the future of the Union movement. 
INTO THE EIGHTIES 
The first conference of a new decade or a new century probably holds some 
form of psychological significance for conference delegates - whether that con-
ference be a conference of unionists, a conference of educationalists or a con-
ference of economists. Such a conference presents an opportunity for review 
and assessment, and the 1980 FoL Conference was no exception. 
President Jim Knox in his openmg address reviewed the difficulties facing the 
unions, and the kinds of strategies that would be necessary for the successful 
overturning of these problems. The first difficulty he raised was that of inflation 
and the fall of living standards for working people. He stated: 
"One of the major problems in measuring living standards is that 
inflation has a different effect upon people at different levels of 
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